class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # Dirty Wars ## War and Political Order ### Jack McDonald --- class: inverse # Pre-Lecture Discussion .question[ Why might enemies cooperate during war and armed conflict? Can you think of any good examples? ] --- class: inverse # Outline .pull-left[ > Dirty wars are conflicts where one or more parties denies the political, legal, and/or moral status/standing of their opponents. How does war connect to politics in dirty wars? ] .pull-right[ - Understanding War - Political Order - Defending Political Order and Political Community - Inherent Practical Dilemmas ] ## Main Points Ideas of right and wrong in war and security are inherently tied to existing political orders Some conflicts are effectively disagreements within the confines of an order, others involve attempts to fundamentally reorder it "Dirty" conduct in war and security often arises from the inherent political hatred and practical dilemmas involved in conflicts over political order ??? 1. part one my theory of War last week war political pressure lots of stuff this week lots of stuff on going through these four things in Order Part one I'm going to explain a theory of war this is my understanding of what war is and what is interesting about War part two will you talking about political order itself to scan a key concept and its relationship to political community and the way in which elites tend to defend Political part three and we will be talking about rebellion and political enmity particularly ideas of citizenship and Treason part four will be looking at security and essentially challenges to the State part five will be looking at inherent YC's practical dilemmas are associated with war and national Security --- class: inverse # Part 1: Understanding War ??? 1. this section looks at the key issue which is what explains the rules in the context of warfare I'm going to outline the key problem as I see with Clausewitz's theory which is that rules are inherent to any kind of violent exchange of violent activity even by their absence the key thing will be talking about in this class are in this section is ways of thinking about warfare in a social context that is a non-dyadic Context and give you kind of a view of explaining everything from how and why parties in a war will cooperate with each other to how and why they break the rules of that conflict in the context that conflict --- # Dyadic Interactions .left-66[ > under broad conditions the fact that fighting is costly and risky implies that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states in dispute would prefer to war... > two mechanisms, or causal logics, explain why rationally led states are sometimes unable to locate or agree on such a bargain: (1) the combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these, and (2) states' inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal. James D. Fearon, _Rationalist Explanations for War_ > ...when the expressed goals in a war are not being achieved, a number of _unexpressed_ goals are nevertheless being fulfilled. David Keen, _Useful Enemies_ ] .right-66[ ![Ngo Dinh Diem, and President Eisenhower, 1957, Public Domain](../img/2020/diem.jpg) .small[Eisenhower and Ngo Dinh Diem, 1957] ] ??? 1. Dyadic interactions are at the front of Clausewitz's theory of war and I'm presenting them here towards the back because I think that you need to see war in its wider coalition context for you jump straight to the dyadic this way of understanding war posits that in highly integrated and interdependent societies with the distribution of power coalitions and coalition formation is the key activity and What where this systemic effects are less of an issue you may see more in terms of the importance of just the dyadic Importantly in most series awards recognise that dyadic interactions can lead to escalation and restrict In my view one of the key issues in war is the fact that both parties to the conflict will be competing within a wider political systemic Therefore there are usually countervailing pressures in favour of restraint and warfare Therefore even when we see carnage or widespread rule breaking we must also look for cooperation and restraint --- # Control and Coalitions > ...we find ourselves with four ideas relating to war and war strategy — that there will be war, that the aim of war is some measure of control, that the pattern of war is not predictable, and that the ultimate tool of control in war is the man on the scene with a gun. John C. Wylie, _Military Strategy_ > The most effective strategies do not depend solely on violence – though this can play an instrumental role, by demonstrating superiority as much as expressing aggression – but benefit instead from the ability to forge coalitions. Lawrence Freedman, _Strategy: A History_ ??? 1. Central to my understanding of war is the relationship between control and coalitions in the context of adversarial Interactions control comes from John Wiley & Sons I Lawrence Freeman has good quote on coalitions I think the key thing is all war exists in the context of positive and negative coalitions you can see the effects of rules in how they enable or prohibit the formation Coalitions the importance of coalitions may vary depending on the conflict and therefore the current dyadic constraints may come to matter more than Coalitions --- # What Explains the Rules of War? .left-column[ ![Network graph, wikimedia commons](../img/2020/network.png) ![Mandelbrot set, from Wikimedia Commons](../img/2020/mandelbrot.jpg) ] .right-column[ | Interaction | Description | |:-----------:|:------------| | Cooperation | Strategic or tactical cooperation in war. E.g. Local peace agreements, mutual limitation of conflict boundaries/scope | | Competition | Competitive action between agents in the context of a wider social system. E.g. Economic or diplomatic competition | | Coercion | Threats of force, or limited uses of force, anything that goes beyond "peaceful" competition. E.g. Sanctions, limited strikes | | Conflict | Organised use of military force within singular/dyadic/systemic boundaries. E.g. IHL-abiding armed conflict | | Carnage | Organised use of military force that intentionally breaks the rules. E.g. direct attacks upon civilians, strategic war crimes | Rules as common knowledge involving coordination between different levels of a state ] ??? Schelling quote from p.3-4 1. Okay so am essentially there are five seas cooperation competition coercion conflict and carnage my argument is that you can understand the rules of war by the balance between these five colour forms of interaction in a dyad sign will tensely this departs from Callas's metaphor of the deal explain all five of these things Key point about this is social context-war is always exist in the context of Coalitions this is why rules matter because rules define Coalitions --- # Problem: Political Enmity .left-column[ ![Carl Schmitt, again](../img/6/schmitt.jpg) - Rebellion - Revolution - Uncontained War ] .right-column[ .medium[ > In comparison with a war of absolute enmity, the contained war of classical European international law, proceeding by recognized rules, is little more than a duel between cavaliers seeking satisfaction. To a communist like Lenin, imbued with absolute enmity, such a war could only appear to be a mere game, a game that he would play in order to mislead the enemy, but one which he basically despised and thought risible. > The modern partisan expects neither justice nor mercy from his enemy. He has turned away from the conventional enmity of the contained war and given himself up to an other — the real — enmity that rises through terror and counter-terror, up to annihilation. Carl Schmitt, _Theory of the Partisan_ > The relevant distinction at work in terms of force and politics... is that between battle and repression: is the violence in question warfare, with organized, reciprocal fighting, or is it the everyday operations of the security apparatus in surveilling and enforcing order? The ambit is not between war and a beatific state of peace, but between armed resistance and the reign of punitive expeditions, police, spies and death squads. Tarak Barkawi, _Decolonizing War_ ] ] ??? 1. characteristic of dirty wars is the presence of political enmity this is essentially the politics of hatred that goes beyond the rules the idea of culture it was all political units are constituted by the enmity towards outsiders obviously this is quite contentious one of things we can't really cover in this course entirely is sources of political enmity because they are too numerous all are going to treat here as political enmity is essentially a form of political opposition that leads individuals or organisations to seek to reorder or overthrow the state or to protect the state that leads on to beyond the bounds of the rule of law --- class: inverse # Part 2: Political Order ??? --- # Challenges to Political Order .left-33[ ![Carrie Nation postcard](../img/6/carrie.jpg) ![Mario Savio](../img/6/savio.jpg) ] .right-33[ > There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part. You can't even passively take part! And you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop! And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it — that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from working at all! Mario Savio - Crime - Social movements - Subversion - Terrorism - Insurgency - Coups ] ??? 1. one of the key things about dirty wars is essentially about treason or members of political community turning against this raises the question of what duties individuals have to a given political order this duties often express the relationship of citizens and the state and what are the limits of dissent to a political order? One of the things will have to grapple with here is essentially unjust orders and the way in which a treat assistance citizenship is an important definition to rate raise here --- # What is Political Order? | Item/level (layer) | Definition | |:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Order: the basic level | Predictability of things within a community or social system | | Order: the second level (demarcation/differentiation) | Order is different from authority, power, domination, peace, structure, stability, and legitimacy etc | | Order: the measurement or operational level (the third level) | Scope (space and size of population), monopoly of violent power, institutionalization (coverage/density and intrusiveness), and subjects’ internalization (of the rules and legitimacy of an order) | | Sources of the stability of an order (the fourth level) | Monopoly of violent power, institutionalization (coverage/density and intrusiveness), subjects’ welfare under an order, and subjects’ internalization (of the rules and legitimacy of an order) | | Legitimacy of an order (the fifth level: normative) | Legitimacy is a holistic term - Objective legitimacy is a strictly procedural term: the only legitimate order is a liberal democracy - Subjective legitimacy: legitimacy of an order as perceived by power-holders, subjects, and bystanders | ??? Table from Tang --- # Power, Violence, and Social Order .pull-left[ .medium[ > social order can be defined as legible, predictable behaviour in accord with recognixed norms. Behaviour of the kind has the potential to build solidarity and cooperation, both of which encourage common identities. Them in turn, help to build and sustain order. The absence of solidarity, meaningful norms and predicatable behavior are the marks of disorder. Ned Lebow, _The Rise and Fall of Political Orders_ > All societies face the problem of violence... the possibility that some individuals will be violent poses a central problem for any group. no society solves the problem of violence by eliminating violence; at best, it can be contained and managed. Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, _Violence and Social Orders_ ] ] .pull-right[ Functionalism: How to solve collective action problem? Political institutions are the natural/rational response to collective action problem. Function of institution explains its existence. Institutionalism: How to control power, violence, and predators? States emerge when "bandits" prefer to enforce a peaceful order over pure extraction. How/why do institutions change? How is it related to economic changes? (Marxism) ] ??? Lebow p.20 north quote p.13 --- class: inverse # Small Group Discussion .question[ How do you define national security? Where is the connection between national security and political order most explicit? ] --- # Defining National Security -- .left-40[ ![Omar Little from The Wire](../img/2021/omar.jpg) > Come at the king, you best not miss. Omar Little, _The Wire_ ] -- .right-40[ .medium[ > National security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats. Melvyn P. Leffler, _National Security_ > The term national security, like national interest, is well enough established in the political discourse of international relations to designate an objective of policy distinguishable from others. We know roughly what people have in mind if they complain that their government is neglecting national security or demanding excessive sacrifices for the sake of enhancing it... The demand for a policy of national security is primarily normative in character. It is supposed to indicate what the policy of a nation should be in order to be either expedient - a rational means toward an accepted end - or moral, the best or least evil course of action. Arnold Wolfers, _National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol_ ] ] ??? --- # Law and Sovereignty .left-33[ ![Hobbes' Leviathan](../img/r10/leviathan.jpg) ![UN Security Council](../img/r10/unsc.jpg) ] .right-33[ > the law may appear inextricably linked to power and especially to the supreme power, political power; indeed it may appear little more than an expression of that power. The law is perceived, therefore, as a command from on high, as written law, as an authoritative and authoritarian voice that emanates from the holder of sovereignty. > Law consists not only in _power_ and _order_, but also in the manner in which society organizes itself in accordance with certain historical values, basing its rules upon these values and observing them in day-to-day life. Paolo Grossi, _A History of European Law_ ] ??? Grossi quote p.xii --- class: inverse # Part 3: Defending Political Order and Political Community ??? 1. so in this section we can look at the main kind of clusters of security challenges to states states face and these are crime terrorism and insurgency we can look at institutions and organisations essentially the security apparatus that state typically have tthen we going to her continue from our ideal coordination look at how these things are usually coordinated together and and what this means for study of international security transnational security --- # Perspectives on Security .pull-left[ .medium[ > The Government’s first and overriding priority is to protect and promote the interests of the British people through our actions at home and overseas. The most important of these interests are: > > - Sovereignty: the ability of the British people to elect their political representatives democratically in line with their constitutional traditions, and to do so free from coercion and manipulation... > - Security: the protection of our people, territory, CNI, democratic institutions and way of life... > - Prosperity: the ability of the British people to enjoy a high level of economic and social well-being, supporting their families and seizing opportunities to improve their lives... UK Cabinet Office, _Global Britain in a Competitive Age_ ] ] .pull-right[ .medium[ ## Realism - Explaining state behaviour by desire for power and absence of international government (Classical) - Explanation lies in anarchical structure of international system and principle of self help among similar units (Neorealism) - Explanation from domestically derived preferences, eg balance of interests such as fear and greed (Neoclassical) ## Liberalism - States are institutions, subject to capture/reconstruction - Explanations of conflict in terms of social identity, commerce, state character and integration with other states ]] ??? 1. international security interstate security partnerships are also important one common feature of what we call dirty wars is relationships between security organisations between states interstate partnerships include intelligence partnerships policing partnerships and military partnerships this is perhaps distinct from the use of proxy forces where state a partners with a nonstate armed group in State B again here coordination matters how why states interact with one another and the assistance they give has ramifications for institutions such as international law but also for common constitutional war powers ring transnational security one thing a dirty wars do bring attention to is transnational layers of the international system these can be an the way in which states can manipulate transnational are architecture such as counterterrorism financing but also many of the groups Estates face tend to be transnational in their goals are for example pan- national revolutionary communism all Al Qaeda and associated fundamentalist organisations so we can see is coordination to secure the state occurs in multiple layers and the boundary between these layers are permeable furthermore to her group seeking to challenge estate often manipulate their boundaries of governance or global governance or international regulation --- .pull-left[ .medium[ ## Constructivism - Security is a social construction, non-material/ideational factors are central to this - Conventional: National identity (history/context) helps determine content of a state’s interests - Critical: How do narratives of national identity come to dominate a context? - Norms (shared expectations of behaviour by particular identity) crucial to understanding politics - Securitization, where securitizing actor defines issue/actor as an existential threat to a referent object, and this is accepted by the audience ## Feminism - Liberal and radical: exclusion and equality, and the essential problems of patriarchy - Role of women in war as both participants and victims ]] .pull-right[ .medium[ ## Critical Theory - As opposed to problem-solving theory: “How did this order come about?” instead of “How do I fix this?” - How do the “facts of life” come to be reified as such? - “Security is what we make of it” (Ken Booth), aim for emancipation as it produces true security ## International Political Sociology - Security is about sacrifice, so who gets to determine what (or who) gets sacrificed? - (in)securitization: Security produces insecurity, and the actors attempting securitization can never know the results of their actions - Internal security merges with external security (e.g. GWOT) ]] ??? 1. international security interstate security partnerships are also important one common feature of what we call dirty wars is relationships between security organisations between states interstate partnerships include intelligence partnerships policing partnerships and military partnerships this is perhaps distinct from the use of proxy forces where state a partners with a nonstate armed group in State B again here coordination matters how why states interact with one another and the assistance they give has ramifications for institutions such as international law but also for common constitutional war powers ring transnational security one thing a dirty wars do bring attention to is transnational layers of the international system these can be an the way in which states can manipulate transnational are architecture such as counterterrorism financing but also many of the groups Estates face tend to be transnational in their goals are for example pan- national revolutionary communism all Al Qaeda and associated fundamentalist organisations so we can see is coordination to secure the state occurs in multiple layers and the boundary between these layers are permeable furthermore to her group seeking to challenge estate often manipulate their boundaries of governance or global governance or international regulation --- # Coordinating Security: Institutions and Organisations .pull-left[ ![Lady Justice, Wikimedia commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported](../img/2020/ladyjustice.png) ![FBI National Crime Information Center, FBI via twitter](../img/2020/ncic.jpg) ] .pull-right[ Institutions reflect, and are defined by, political orders Tradeoffs in the design of institutions and coercive organisations differ between liberal democracies and autocracies Sheena Greitens - Dominant perceived threat (external/popular uprising/coup) of autocratic ruler is key to understanding how their security apparatus is designed in terms of fragmentation and exclusivity ] ??? 1. states are bundles of institutions and organisations when you look under the hood organisations and organisational theory and seeks to understand how my organisation behave the way in which they do the security apparatus of the state are the organisations of the state are devoted to national security note that this in many states is defence against internal and external threats one key division within many states are organisations are dedicated and have authority to act against internal threats but as organisations that typically face outwards this particular case with intelligence organisations, and also police which are typically a domestic organisation military forces typically are constrained in their ability to operate on her and keep the domestic peace in liberal democratic societies but often contribute capabilities to the preservation of domestic national security --- # Ordering Organisations and Activities .left-column[ ![Stasi HQ](../img/6/stasi.jpg) ![AAD, a paramilitary group](../img/6/aad.jpg) ] .right-column[ > Extremists of all kinds use malevolent narratives to justify behaviour that contradicts and undermines the values that are the foundation of our society. If left unchallenged, these narratives fragment and divide our communities. We protect the values of our society – the rule of law, individual liberty, democracy, mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs – by tackling extremism in all its forms. HMG, _CONTEST_ > It is up to us to organize the people. As for the reactionaries in China, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. It is like sweeping the floor; where the broom does not reach, the dust never vanishes of itself. Mao Tse-Tung, _The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan_ ] ??? Observation of Charles Tilly at all that violence is fundamental to the generation of political orders Essentially activities a state can be seen as ordering activities so little cooperation in this frame is an ordering activity political repression equally interstate violence as an ordering activity as is revolution political violence is often about the generation of a specific type of political order that enables an actor to thrive or achieve its goals conflict actors such as warlords and so on are not so much disorderly actors as actors that generate an order which enables them to exert power is the maximum extent possible --- class: inverse # Small Group Discussion .question[ What kinds of dilemmas might be inherent to defending or challenging a political order? ] --- class: inverse # Part 4: Inherent Practical Dilemmas ??? 1. one thing that dirty wars brings attention to are the inherent practical dilemmas of securing and challenging the state that is we can't just think of rules and institutions, we have to look at some of the underlying dilemmas facing organisations on either side of these conflicts in this sense we are either kinda medium position and between realist conceptions of international war and international order which focus upon and inherent dilemmas or structural explanations and for behaviour sometimes rooted in rational expectations and utility theory and social constructivism or post positivist approaches that place heavy emphasis on ideas and see the social life and interaction is inherently mutable attention will look at for kinder classes of dilemma here inherent dilemma of control that is how you control an opponent when they resort to force the dilemma facing insurgents balancing challenging the state and versus maintaining support dilemmas facing leaders on either side kind of conflict and organisational dilemmas-the problems facing the organisation's to carry out the dirty work --- # The Dilemmas of Control A practical dilemma is something largely independent of ideas. For example, to succeed in any adversarial situation, the fact that an opponent has free will/agency is likely to give rise to a set of practical dilemmas. > The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control of the enemy for the strategist's own purpose; > this is achieved by control of the pattern of war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent. John C. Wylie, _Military Strategy_ -- > ...the control sought in war should be neither so extreme as to amount to extermination - this is probably a cultural value judgment of the writer, and might not be valid in the eyes of one from a less humane culture - nor should it be so tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to the victor... ??? 1. so as outlined in my understanding Warburton controls a central feature of what war the issue is how to exert control over an adversary and the means by which this can be achieved Clausewitz's theory deal wrestling overthrow attacking centres of gravity-does this work cock? The dilemma for states is that the use of force to coerce or control an opponent is inevitably imprecise and therefore when an opponent hides themselves within a population mistakes will inevitably me made so the dilemma is how to use force or other tools to control one's adversary without sign or dangerously losing the support of the population second dilemma how to use force effectively without violating the institutions of the state or without self subversion of your political culture these dilemmas are effectively similar for the challenges to state, except the challenges often lack state capabilities and therefore may have to resort to action such as terrorism in order to succeed --- # The Dilemmas of Insurgency > A point often missed is that _Small Wars_ is not simply a book about warfare against 'savages'. Partisan warfare in 'civilised' countries is also included. Daniel Whittingham, _'Savage warfare': C.E. Callwell, the roots of counter-insurgency, and the nineteenth century context_ Survival and escalation Population control Identity & Identification One-sided violence ??? 1. continuing from the dilemmas of control insurgency poses specific dilemmas about states and their relationship to citizens for example how should one treat and rebellious citizens as criminals four insurgents insurgency poses, next central dilemma which is how to use force to destabilise the state and erode away away at its capabilities without provoking massive overreaction the may crush you furthermore insurgents must live off the people and therefore have to use a mix of corporation coercion and to survive with the population are simultaneously trying to persuade --- # The Leaders' Dilemmas > Most people in any culture, therefore, will take for granted a particular course of action or consider only a few alternatives. That they choose from a restricted set will, for most of them, remain below the threshold of consciousness, because they seldom encounter individuals who take for granted quite different assumptions. David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, _A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?_ Political survival in a given political culture Coordination problems Capability issues ??? 1. four leaders on either side they are faced with quite interesting dilemma about political survival returning to our team of competition political elites are typically in competition with other elites and seek to replace them, if not they are reliant upon a select route and that may break their win, winning coalition leaders must therefore balance their own political survival against the survival of the political order against their political capital they'll need to expend to maintain their coordination of security apparatus if a leader is insecure either insurgent or incumbent and they may need to take action which is inherently weakens their ability to fight adversary in order to survive in place fundamentally in democracies her the buck stops with political elites and there is no higher kind of authority or manual in many senses to tell them what they should do --- # Organisational Dilemmas > Indeed, the case of COINTELPRO-New Left shows that endogenous organizational processes within state agencies are key to understanding the level of repression received by particular protest groups. Rather than directly resulting from these groups' size, level of activity, or predilection for violence, the patterning of repression by the FBI was bound by the flow of information within the bureau and the consequent ability for SMOs to become visible at the national level of the FBI. David Cunningham, _The Patterning of Repression_ ??? Cunningham quote p.234 1. security organisations face with political challenges the state face a variety dilemmas based on the character of the organisation the key dilemma is how to treat or conceive of an opponent for example military's can treat opponents as enemies or military targets whereas police how much tougher time adjusting to this kind of idea organisations may need to work in close coupling with other organisations that have very different ideas or organisational attitudes towards threats to the state and fundamentally the use of violence is often difficult to manage within an organisation enacting violence it has a psychological cost for the individuals concerned and organisations essentially need to ensure that the organisation continues this may be a problem if you're working police are getting brutalised --- # Conclusions .large[ What is war, what is security? Why does that matter? Political order delimits acceptable conduct within a social system Wars involving disagreements about legitimate political order are often vicious Practical features of organising for war and security matter! ] ??? 1. asd 2. asd