class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # Dirty Wars ## Political Warfare and Political Repression ### Jack McDonald --- class: inverse # Outline .pull-left[ > Dirty wars are conflicts where one or more parties denies the political, legal, and/or moral status/standing of their opponents. What are the political reasons for this? ] .pull-right[ - Contentious Politics and Political Survival - Political Warfare - Political Repression - Problems Facing Institutions and Organisations - Conclusions and Connections ] ## Main Points The distinction between war, national security, and political repression is not as clear as some might wish Perspectives drawn from social mobilisation can help us to understand the dynamics of internal conflicts Political enmity in dirty wars means that rule-breaking (or suspension) should be expected on one or more sides ??? --- class: inverse # Part 1: Contentious Politics and Political Survival ??? --- # States, Regimes, Survival .pull-left[  _De jure_ and _de facto_ state death ] .pull-right[ How do regimes end? - Peaceful power transitions (elections) - Coups - Armed revolution, insurgency - "Peaceful" revolutions How do regimes survive? - Allocating political goods - Institutional change (positive and negative!) - Coup-proofing - Political repression - Counter-insurgency - Counter-terrorism - Counter-subversion ] ??? --- # Violent and Non-Violent Political Contention > Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents. Such confrontations go back to the dawn of history. But mounting, coordinating, and sustaining them against powerful opponents is the unique contribution of the social movement – an invention of the modern age and an accompaniment of the rise of the modern state. Contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own. People contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins. When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents – to social movements. Sidney G. Tarrow, _Power in Movement_ ??? Tarrow quote p.6 --- # Uncontained Political Contention .left-33[  ] .right-33[ .medium[ > To date, researchers have paid far more attention to the evils done against governments (and citizens) by dissidents, rebels, and terrorists than to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction. Christian Davenport, _State Repression and Political Order_ > In comparison with a war of absolute enmity, the contained war of classical European international law, proceeding by recognized rules, is little more than a duel between cavaliers seeking satisfaction. To a communist like Lenin, imbued with absolute enmity, such a war could only appear to be a mere game, a game that he would play in order to mislead the enemy, but one which he basically despised and thought risible. Carl Schmitt, _Theory of the Partisan_ ] ] ??? --- # National Security and Contentious Politics .pic80[] ??? --- # War and Contentious Politics .pic60[] ??? --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .question[ Do you think that war and national security should be studied like a continuum, or do you think that differences between war and peace (etc) create discrete states of affairs? ] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 2: Political Warfare ??? --- # Political Warfare .pic60[ ] ??? Rand diagram from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html --- # Insurgency and Pacification > The term "other war," meaning pacification operations, arose in Vietnam to differentiate those operations from the "real war" of conventional search-and-destroy operations. Austin Long, _On "Other War"_ > As long as there is no privacy, as long as every unusual move or event is reported and checked, as long as parents are afraid to talk in front of their children, how can contacts be made, ideas spread, recruiting accomplished? David Galula, _Counterinsurgency Warfare_ ??? Long quote p.2 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf --- # Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism .pic60[] ??? Contest 2018 Prevent, pursue, protect, prepare --- # Subversion > ...can be defined as illegal measures short of the use of armed force, taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or force them to do things which they do not want to do. > ...although the British prefer to use the security service and the police, rather than the army, to counter subversion within the United Kingdom, this does not mean that either subversion or the countering of it, is any less a manifestation of war. > Subversion is a form of war and countering it, or even fostering it in a hostile foreign country, may, on occasion, have to be included as part of a nation's defence policy. Frank Kitson, _Warfare as a Whole_ ??? non-violent political warfare election interference! Note connections with leninist thought here! --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .question[ How open should democracies be about counter-subversion? ] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 3: Political Repression ??? --- # Political Repression > What distinguishes political repression from other forms of control, such as general social control or crime control? Moreover, when is something actually repressive, versus just resistant to change—e.g., what is the difference between people who drag their feet against change versus those who actively suppress actors pushing for change? Jennifer Earl, _Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control_ Key issue for the current context: What counts as political repression? ??? --- # Law and Repression > Dirty wars are unlikely to be subject to recognized laws and conventions. They are likely to be characterized by a seeming absence of rule-bound arrangements. Certainly, the rule of law is likely to be absent. More probably, rule _by_ law will represent the norm, comprising dictates, fiats, edicts, curfews, and other authoritarian methods to impose restrictions on one side while freeing up one’s own forces to do more less what they like. In essence, one might term this as constructing a "façade of legality," using the legitimacy invested in the state to erect a structure that casts a shadow or veil behind which dirty war methods can be instituted. M.L.R. Smith and Sophie Gray, _War in the Gray_ ??? --- # CT and Political Repression .left-33[  Martin McGuiness in his first post-ban interview ] .right-33[ > Proscription makes it a criminal offence to: > > - belong, or profess to belong, to a proscribed organisation in the UK or overseas... > - invite support for a proscribed organisation (the support invited need not be material support, such as the provision of money or other property, and can also include moral support or approval)... > - express an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation, reckless as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support a proscribed organisation... Home Office, _Proscribed Terrorist Organisations_ ] ??? prohibition also covers arranging meetings, wearing clothing, publishing images of clothes/flags --- # De-Radicalisation > ...the de-radicalization campaign implements a holistic strategy... adopts different approaches... deploys multifaceted programs... underscores community engagement... is an experimental undertaking. > In regards to the custodial programs in Xinjiang, it is definitely too early to declare success. Zunyou Zhou, _Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization_ > According to this logic, replacing religious beliefs with 'correct' state ideology through re-education is akin to a detoxification process that is freely provided by a benevolent state. > While there is no certainty, it is reasonable to speculate that the total number of detainees is between several hundred thousand and just over one million. Adrian Zenz, _'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude'_ ??? --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .question[What types of political actors can/can't commit political repression?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 4: Problems Facing Institutions and Organisations ??? - Secrecy and Security Institutions - Governing Political Repression - Civil-Military Relations Issues --- # Influence, Populations, and Legitimacy .pull-left[  ] .pull-right[ > The danger of domestic dissemination does not lie in the dissemination itself; rather, it lies in _anonymous_ dissemination. To curb the potential harm of covert government propaganda, there must be either legislation or a judicial doctrine that requires the State Department and the BBG* to attribute their materials. Weston R. Sager, _Apple Pie Propaganda?_ * Now U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) ] ??? --- # Coordination Problems > Another important institutional constraint on pacification was the lack, until very late, of any management structure for it. Neither in Vietnam nor in Washington... was there any agency charged with managing anything so atypical as a pacification program. However important, this aspect of counter-insurgency war had no bureaucratic vested interest speaking for it. Robert W. Komer, _Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program_ ??? Quote from p.235 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documents/2006/D20104.pdf --- # Organising Security .pull-left[ Organisational constraints - Telos of the organisation - Organisational capacity - Legal and political constraints Rule of law Civil freedoms and civil authorities Institutional interactions, oversight, and accountability ] .pull-right[ > [Police] "Civil Reps" as they have become known, have proved extremely useful. In many areas they are the only members of central or local government that the people know and can turn to. The Civil Rep has become a "Mr Fixit", who is also a mine of information on how to get things done-a "red tape dodger". P.W. Graham, _Low-level Civil/Military Coordination, Belfast, 1970-73_ ] ??? --- # The Intelligence Dillemma .pull-left[ > Information is a key resource in irregular war; it is the link connecting one side’s strength with the other side’s weakness. > It is possible, nevertheless, to distinguish between three major sources of information: material indices, violent extraction, and consensual provision. Stathis Kalyvas, _The Logic of Violence in Civil War_ ] .pull-right[ Problems for states: - Intelligence collection activities that infringe upon civil liberties - Negative social perceptions of intelligence collection in civilian populations - Rumours! Problems for insurgents - Secrecy is life, but intelligence collection exposes networks to denunciation - Balancing intimidation and persuasion is difficult! ] ??? --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .question[Do you think it is ever possible for security organisations to strike a perfect balance between national security and human rights? If not, which side should they err towards?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 5: Conclusions and Connections ??? --- # Key Issues .large[ A key escalation point in social mobilisation and war is when accepted standards of conduct are abandoned by the authorities (either unilaterally or equally in war) Some kinds of political goals logically lead to the violation of normative standards Domestic law is always in flux, but some activities (preventative detention, torture, blanket censorship) are difficult to accomodate within a rule of law framework ] ??? --- # Key Questions .large[ Can states preserve freedom of speech and conscience, at the same time as seeking to eliminate "harmful" ideas or political beliefs from society? What is the answer to opponents that seek to eliminate you completely? To what extent should state agencies adjust their organisational structures and priorities to deal with threats defined by the government? ] ??? --- class: inverse # Pre-Lecture Discussion .question[ Can Facebook commit political repression? ] ??? --- class: inverse # Case Study: Counter-Insurgency in Vietnam ??? --- # The War in the Villages .pull-left[  War, or political repression? ] .pull-right[ What can political repression and political warfare tell us about COIN in Vietnam? (And vice-versa) Key aspect of both the First Indochina War (1946-1954) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was attempts by both incumbent and challenger to secure the support of the rural population of Vietnam From a peasant's perspective, the Vietnam War meant being caught between competing preferences of North Vietnam/communist guerrillas, South Vietnam government, and US forces ] ??? --- # Background: The Cold War .left-column[   ] .right-column[ Period of continuous confrontation and indirect conflict between West-aligned states and Soviet Union/China Primary focus of military planning is Europe Possession of atomic weapons, then thermonuclear weapons, makes direct military confrontation risky - pushes confrontation to indirect conflicts Each side seeks to maintain friendly governments in third-party states, by any means necessary ] ??? --- # COIN in the Cold War .pull-left[ Pacification and Counter-Insurgency were key pieces of the Cold War puzzle Nationalist and Communist guerilla forces challenged crumbling European empires, which initially used colonial control methods in a bid to retain their possessions Both sides sought to install friendly governments in new states, and defend those governments against internal and external challenges Contentious politics with a capital C, since both sides saw the machinations of the other in any political challenge to a friendly regime ] .pull-right[  ] ??? --- # Background: South-East Asia in the Cold War .pull-left[  .small[South-East Asia in 1959] ] .pull-right[ Violence in Cold War primarily restricted to peripheral theatres, even though victory in these theatres considered to be essential South-East Asia was the bloodiest theatre of great power competition in this era: - Chinese Civil War (~6m total, 2.5m 1945-49) - Korean War (~5m) - Indochina (0.4-0.8m)/Vietnam War (1.3-3.4m) - Genocides in Indonesia (0.5-1.2m) and Cambodia (1.5-2m) ] ??? --- # The First Indochina War .left-33[  ] .right-33[ - France conquers Indochina from the mid 19th century to the early 20th century - 1940: France defeated in Europe, Vichy France takes control of colonies - 1940-1941: Japan enters, then extends control over Indochina (with limited French autonomy), Viet Minh resistance begins against both France and Japan - March-May 1945: Japan takes control of Indochina from French administration - August 1945: Japan capitulates in WW2 - 1946: French colonial empire becomes the French Union - Also 1946: Nationalist and communist revolt in every part of French Indochina ] ??? --- # Political Warfare > the Vietminh regarded revolutionary war as composed of two closely linked facets, the military struggle or _dau tranh vu trang_, and the political struggle or _dau tranh chinh tri_. Their combined use created a form of war which was hitherto unseen, a single war waged on several programmatical fronts and conducted by a single authority. Philippe Pottier, _GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War_ .pull-left[ Three stage war concept (derived from Chinese experience) 1. Form mobile guerrilla bands and safe-havens 1. "Mobile war" - Blend guerrilla warfare with battles/traditional unit formations 1. Counteroffensive - traditional military formations on offensive ] .pull-right[ _dau tranh chinh tri_: - Undermine opposing force by getting government soldiers to defect or desert - Spread dissent among population - Organise population for hierarchical control, so as to blunt opposing intelligence, enlist population as soldiers/labourers, and raise funds ] ??? --- # To the Geneva Conference .pull-left[ .medium[ Viet Minh grow in strength from 1946-1951, but are defeated in a 1951 general offensive launched by General Vo Nguyen Giap (Commander-in-chief) General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (French C-in-C) decides to try to deny Viet Minh control of Tonkin delta via fortification and pacification To combat Viet Minh in Highlands, de Lettre orders creation of _maquis_ units to harass them French Major Roger Trinquier re-roles these to combat Viet Minh subversion Stalemate ensues, until fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and the Geneva Conference splits Vietnam at the 17th parallel ] ] .pull-right[ France then takes these experiences to the Algerian war (1954-1962): > The _guerre révolutionnaire_, as this new IW doctrine came to be called, asserted that, in order to defeat an insurgency, one had to adopt its most efficient weapon: dictatorship. The core idea was to impose a temporary totalitarian control over society and population in order to sever any possible ties with the rebellion, thus leaving it deprived of its main resource and legitimacy. Élie Tenenbaum, _French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War_ ] ??? --- # The Vietnam War .left-40[  ] .right-40[ - Vietnam (Nov 1955 - Apr 1975) - North Vietnam plus Viet Cong vs South Vietnam - External backers - Laos (May 1959 - Dec 1975) - Royal Lao govt vs North Vietnam and Pathet Lao vs Neutralists - ...external backers - Cambodia (Jan 1968 - Apr 1975) - Government vs Khmer Rouge and North Vietnam and Viet Cong - ...external backers Note that Thailand was a key country in this conflict, both backing governments with troops, equipment, and training; as well as a key staging area for US forces ] ??? --- # COIN in Context .pull-left[  ] .pull-right[ Large scale conventional and guerrilla warfare occurs across all three countries Strategic bombing campaign (Rolling Thunder 1965-68) conducted by US against North Vietnam Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos and Cambodia enables North Vietnam to infiltrate/supply Viet Cong in South Vietnam US steadily dragged into conflict, until 1968 Tet Offensive, adopts policy of "Vietnamization" in 1969 Ceasefire and US exit in 1973 following Paris Peace Accords, Saigon falls in 1975 ] ??? --- # The War in the Villages .left-40[ > Another important institutional constraint on pacification was the lack, until very late, of any management structure for it. Neither in Vietnam nor in Washington... was there any agency charged with managing anything so atypical as a pacification program. However important, this aspect of counter-insurgency war had no bureaucratic vested interest speaking for it. Robert W. Komer, _Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program_ ] .right-40[ .medium[ - 1952 - 1954 - French "pacification by prosperity" creating protected villages (_agrovilles_) moves 3 million people - 1954 - Diem govt begins (failed) suppression of Viet Minh supporters in countryside - 1959 - Diem govt begins resettlement programmes - Relocates Viet Minh supporters to one class of villages, South Vietnam govt supporters to another - Relocated people forced to provide the labour to build the villages - 1961 - Strategic Hamlet Program launched, considered a failure - 1964 - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) begins small scale pacification program, but lacks ARVN support - 1965 - Substantial increases in US forces in country - 1967-1973 - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) - Unified US/South Vietnam programme under MACV - Successful, but then war becomes conventional ] ] ??? --- # Phoenix Program/Phung Hoang .left-33[  ] .right-33[ .medium[ > The basic essence of the program is a fully coordinated intelligence effort of all existing GVN and United States agencies targeted specifically on the VCI with the express purpose of neutralizing its effectiveness and control over the people. CIA, _Factsheet for the Senate Armed Services Committee_ Directly attacks the Revolutionary Infrastructure (Viet Cong Infrastructure) shadow governance Active 1967-1972, using Provincial Reconnaisance Units, interrogation centres, and intelligence coordination to identify and "neutralise" members of the VCI 81,740 "neutralised" of whom 26,639 killed (mostly in combat operations) Interrogations involved torture and sometimes execution, often conducted by PRU Heavily criticised in the US as a civilian assassination program Believed to be effective by both US and their opponents ] ] ??? --- # Political Order and Political Survival .pull-left[ **South Vietnam** - 1960 attempted military coup - 1963 Buddhist Crisis leads to 1963 military coup and death of Ngo Dinh Diem - 1964-5 3 coups - Eliminated as independent polity in 1975 **Cambodia** - 1970 coup overthrows monarchy, creates the Khmer Republic - 1975-1979 ruled by Khmer Rouge - Cambodian genocide kills almost 1/4 of population - Occupation by Vietnam 1978-1989 ] .pull-right[ **Laos** - 1960 coup splits the army - Attempted coups: 2 in 1964, 2 in 1965, 1 1966, 1 in 1973 - 1975 Pathet Lao overthrow government **USA** - 1960s is a period of domestic social turmoil (civil rights movement, counter-culture) - 1964-1973 US military drafts 2.2 million Americans to fight - Huge political backlash against the war - 1968 Tet Offensive and My Lai - Possibility of institutional collapse in US army ] ??? --- class: inverse # Small Group Discussion .question[What can we take from this case to help us to understand contemporary conflicts? Consider the degree to which comparisons can be made.] ??? --- # Learning the Wrong Lessons? > These [_la guerre révolutionnaire_] thinkers often failed to appreciate the legitimacy of underlying, historical grievances that fuelled the impetus and conduct of social transformation. These changes not only included grievances against French colonialism, but also grievances against a Confucianist-based world order that failed to offer sufficient modernization for important components of Vietnamese society, particularly intellectuals which included nationalists and communists. -- > It was these broader changes in society, along with the spark ignited by extensive and long-simmering grievances with French imperialism that Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare manipulated and cyclically generated in Indochina. -- > In an important sense, it was impossible for France to hold back the social dynamic of transformation taking place and neither France nor the United States possessed enough perspective to recognize this phenomenon. Nathaniel L. Moir, _Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare in Indochina_ ??? --- # The Central Conceit of COIN .pull-left[  ] .pull-right[ Stacking the deck on one side is a political act! Principal-agent problem is a significant aspect of COIN Contrasting visions of political order (regime, regime's external backers) and contrasting visions of should pay for it ] ??? --- # Food for Thought: Zomia .left-40[  ] .right-40[ The cool thing about being an academic is that you get to play with ideas > The effect of all state-making projects of this kind was to create a shatter zone or flight zone to which those wishing to evade or to escape bondage fled. These regions of refuge constituted a direct “state effect.” Zomia simply happens to be, owing largely to the precocious early expansion of the Chinese state, one of the most extensive and oldest zones of refuge. James C. Scott, _The Art of Not Being Governed_ ] ??? --- class: inverse # Questions?